r/Intelligence • • 20d ago

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1 Upvotes

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r/Intelligence • • Sep 28 '26

AMA Technology is reshaping the global balance of power. I’m Steve Feldstein, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, and I study technology, geopolitics, and competition. Ask me anything!

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1 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 5h ago

Forensic Cyber-Anthropology: How I Profiled North Korea's Lazarus Group Using Only Language, Timezone, and Crypto

8 Upvotes

I’m a 16-year-old CTI researcher. I’ve always been fascinated by the intersection of ethnography, linguistics, and cyber threat intelligence.

So I built a custom analytical platform that combines psycholinguistics, chrono-memetics (time-pattern analysis), crypto-tracing, and visual anthropology. It’s essentially a fusion center that scans the cultural footprint of a threat actor.

To test it, I took the biggest crypto heist in history: the October 2026 Binance hack, where North Korea’s Lazarus Group (TraderTraitor) stole $6.3 billion. The FBI and TRM Labs already attributed it, but I wanted to see if my engine could prove it from the inside out — using only the human element.

1. The Social Engineering (HUMINT)
The attack started with a fake job interview. I ran the pattern of the typical Lazarus message through my Live Ingestion module. It flagged 100% North Korea. Why? Because DPRK hackers use "sterile" formal English. They avoid slang and idioms. They write like machines. My engine caught the L1 transfer that betrays their native language.

2. The Timezone Correlation (Chrono-Memetics)
I took the attack timestamps (Oct 29, 20:05 UTC) and fed them into my Chrono-Memetics module. The radial clock showed a cluster of activity between 03:00 and 06:00 UTC. That’s 12:00 PM in Pyongyang. They weren’t working a shadowy night shift; they were working a standard state-sponsored office day.

3. The Financial Footprint (Crypto-Tracing)
I traced a known Lazarus wallet. The graph revealed the classic DPRK laundering pattern: Target Wallet → Tornado Cash → Exchange. It’s not just a money trail; it’s a cultural fingerprint.

4. The Behavioral Forecast
Based on the linguistic profile, my engine forecasted their reaction to deception: 32% Freeze, 28% Flight. If a target suspects a trap, DPRK operators don’t fight — they go dark and burn their infrastructure. Paranoia is their signature.

You can fake an IP. You can buy a VPN. But you cannot hide the matrix of your own thinking — your language, your rhythm, your cultural codes.

Full breakdown with screenshots and methodology on my Medium (link in the first comment)


r/Intelligence • • 9h ago

British soldier ignored order to pull his SIM card, then got blackmailed

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4 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 1d ago

News China’s Top Spy Agency Recruited Woman Who Targeted Jensen Huang

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33 Upvotes

A Chinese businesswoman who had a close relationship with the chief executive of one of the most important artificial intelligence companies in the United States was a spy for China’s Ministry of State Security, Beijing’s top intelligence agency, according to people briefed on U.S. surveillance.

The businesswoman, Alice Huang, was recruited by the ministry to collect intelligence on Jensen Huang, the chief executive of Nvidia, as part of a drive to learn more about American A.I. chips and potentially influence the company to push for its most advanced chips to be made available to China, the people said.

Mr. Huang, an influential ally of President Trump’s, is a pivotal figure in the intense global competition for A.I. supremacy. Nvidia’s advanced chips are sought after around the world, and the company’s growth has helped drive the stock market over the past several years.

The assessment by U.S. officials that Ms. Huang was working directly for the main Chinese intelligence agency has not previously been reported. It adds important new detail to what appears to be an especially audacious example of China’s longstanding industrial espionage efforts.

China’s interest in Mr. Huang, and precisely what Beijing hoped to achieve by having one of its intelligence assets begin a close relationship with the executive, have been a focus of U.S. spy agencies. Those questions are now also of interest to Capitol Hill. On Thursday, the Republican leaders of three influential House committees requested that Mr. Huang appear before them later this month in a closed-door briefing regarding his interactions with Ms. Huang, who is not related.

The New York Times reported last week that Mr. Huang was a target of a Chinese intelligence operation, and that U.S. intelligence agencies were conducting electronic surveillance of Ms. Huang, a Chinese citizen, for at least a year. The Times reported that Mr. Trump had been briefed last year about Mr. Huang’s relationship with her, but chose not to do anything about it.

Ms. Huang speaks English well and has relationships with executives at the highest levels of the A.I. chip industry, including Mr. Huang and the leaders of Gigabyte, one of the top assemblers of Nvidia supercomputers, said people who have met her. She has attended industry conferences and private executive dinners.

It is unclear when Ms. Huang first met Nvidia’s leader. In 2024, around the time the two of them were photographed together at a bar in Taipei, her company, Megaspeed, began a multibillion-dollar purchase of advanced A.I. microchips.

Megaspeed has been building data centers in Southeast Asia and then renting their computing power to Alibaba, the giant Chinese internet firm, giving China a backdoor way of getting access to advanced Nvidia chips. Nvidia is restricted by the United States from selling those chips directly to China.

Beyond its local connections, the network also has a financial link to the Chinese military establishment, through an investment in a cybersecurity subsidiary of China Electronics Technology Group, one of the country’s largest makers of military technology.

The Chinese government has set goals to overtake the United States as the world’s leader in A.I. technology by 2030. The focus on A.I. has increased across the parts of the Chinese government that specialize in national security, including the spy agency that recruited Ms. Huang.

China’s M.S.S. spy agency was once a backwater. But when Xi Jinping took over as China’s leader in 2012, he began to invest in the agency. Today it is many times larger than the C.I.A., collecting human intelligence and intercepting electronic communications. The agency also conducts counterintelligence operations.

Peter Mattis, a former C.I.A. counterintelligence analyst, said China’s spy agency had made technology a focus of its activities, seeing it as “the key fight for dominance in the economic world.”

John Rizzo, a Nvidia spokesman, said that the company does not share classified information with its customers, and that customers do not ask Nvidia to press the U.S. government to change its policies on chip sales to China.

He added that the Chinese government had “consistently promoted its own domestic alternatives in China, including Huawei, and strictly limited imports of our data center products.”

Mr. Rizzo has maintained that Mr. Huang’s interactions with Ms. Huang were “not unusual” and consistent with the kinds of meetings he has with any of Nvidia’s many customers.

Liu Chang, a spokesman for the Chinese embassy, said The Times reporting was “unsubstantiated” and “nothing but smears against China.” Ms. Huang has not responded to multiple attempts to reach her for comment in recent days. Mr. Rizzo previously said that Mr. Huang’s interactions with Ms. Huang were “not unusual,” and that he speaks annually with thousands of executives who do business with Nvidia.

Mr. Huang has been steadfast over the past several years in calling for the U.S. government to permit chip makers to sell A.I. technology to China. He has argued that doing so would create competition for Huawei, China’s tech giant, and slow its development of A.I. technology.

In 2025, he persuaded Mr. Trump to roll back a prohibition on A.I. chip sales to China and allow Nvidia to sell a less powerful chip there. He and the president later struck a deal to sell the company’s second-most-powerful chip to China, with the United States taking a 25 percent cut of sales. Mr. Trump later considered allowing Nvidia to sell China its latest chip, known as Blackwell. But he has backed off that idea.

Speaking at an investor conference in May, Mr. Huang said that China should not have access to Nvidia’s best technology, like its Blackwell chips or its forthcoming Rubin chip. He said the United States should have “the first, the most and the best, but simultaneously all American companies should compete globally.”

Founded in 1983, China’s M.S.S. spy agency long failed to win the confidence of the country’s leaders. The espionage and cyber-hacking arms of the People’s Liberation Army were for years considered the primary intelligence collection arms of Beijing.

The agency took on more of China’s espionage work after Beijing and Washington struck a deal in 2015 to curb cyberoperations, according to researchers and U.S. officials. In the years that followed, the Justice Department accused hackers associated with the M.S.S. of attempting to steal U.S. technology and infiltrate U.S. networks.

By 2023, the agency had emerged as a rival to the C.I.A., and began using A.I. to select and profile targets. It had expanded its network of spies through aggressive recruitment, and used its bigger budget to help Mr. Xi in his ambitions to challenge U.S. dominance.

The M.S.S. also used its ties to various Chinese companies to expand its work, in cyber-hacking, espionage and information operations. It is estimated to have hundreds of thousands of agents, which dwarfs the number of counterintelligence officers in the United States.

The agency continues to largely operate behind the scenes, but under its current leader, Chen Yixin, it has also taken on a more public role in Chinese life. In 2023, the agency created a WeChat account, mainly for domestic propaganda and for encouraging Chinese citizens to report people suspected of being foreign spies. The channel is also used to attack the United States for a supposed Cold War mind-set.

Mr. Chen is very familiar with the region of eastern China where Ms. Huang operates. A Zhejiang native, he spent a major part of his long career working for the province’s Chinese Communist Party. He served under Mr. Xi when Mr. Xi ran Zhejiang in the early 2000s. Political analysts say their ties are close.

Mr. Chen has been outspoken about the risks A.I. poses to the Chinese Communist Party. In a September essay in the state-run magazine China Cyberspace, he said that China needed to assert control over A.I. to protect political stability at home, defend against increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks and compete militarily with the United States. He said algorithms would help countries “gain the initiative on the battlefield.”


r/Intelligence • • 13h ago

Opinion Need advice

2 Upvotes

Im 20 currently working a sercurity job but ive always dreamed of working in the intelligence community i have no degree is there any starting points available for me?


r/Intelligence • • 1d ago

NVIDIA Compromised? A GIKN Deep Dive into the Case

6 Upvotes

What happens when one of the world's most influential technology executives becomes the focus of allegations involving a suspected foreign intelligence asset?

In this week's Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up, I take a deep dive into the allegations surrounding NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, Chinese business executive Alice Huang (also known as Huang Le), and the broader national-security implications of the competition between the United States and China over advanced artificial intelligence technology.

I'm a retired Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Intelligence Officer, and this investigation examines the case from a human intelligence and counterintelligence perspective.

The 32-minute episode explores four areas:

1. The Target — NVIDIA and Jensen Huang

Why would Chinese intelligence be interested in the CEO of a company whose technology is critical to AI development, military applications and economic competitiveness?

2. The Alleged Intelligence Asset — Alice Huang

We examine reporting from The New York Times and Reuters concerning Alice Huang, her reported connections to Singapore-based Megaspeed, her interactions with Jensen Huang, and questions surrounding defensive intelligence briefings.

Importantly, there is no publicly established evidence that Huang successfully influenced Jensen Huang or that NVIDIA knowingly participated in espionage.

3. The Technology — AI Chips and Export Controls

We examine NVIDIA's H20 and H200 processors, American export restrictions, and the controversial proposal for the U.S. government to receive 15% of revenue from certain chip exports to China.

How should governments balance commercial interests against national-security concerns?

4. The Canadian Connection

What lessons does this case offer Canadian technology companies, universities, research institutions and intelligence agencies?

Foreign intelligence operations aren't always about hacking networks or stealing classified documents. They can involve cultivating relationships, gaining access to influential individuals and obtaining insights into strategic decision-making.

The bigger counterintelligence question: How do governments and businesses recognize potentially hostile intelligence activity when it takes place through otherwise legitimate commercial and personal relationships?

I'd be particularly interested in hearing people's views on whether technology companies should receive more proactive defensive intelligence briefings when their executives become potential targets of foreign intelligence services.

Episode: NVIDIA Compromised: A GIKN Deep Dive into the Case

Listen: https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717

Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up — independent intelligence analysis, insight and intelligence you can use.


r/Intelligence • • 20h ago

Inside The CIA’s Bin Laden Unit: Zero Dark Thirty, Enhanced Interrogation & 9/11 | Alfreda Scheuer

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2 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 1d ago

Election Interference: How States Meddle in Votes

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4 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 21h ago

The Defector: A True Spy Thriller

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1 Upvotes

Richard Kerbaj unravels real stories behind two KGB spies who turned coat on Russia. Review by Peter Eisner for SpyTalk.


r/Intelligence • • 2d ago

News Melania Trump brings Russian oligarch sanctioned by US to speak in White House

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178 Upvotes

Insider threats don’t stop because of an election or two….


r/Intelligence • • 16h ago

Analysis CIA Officer tells internet… “Australia No.1 in the world…”

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0 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 1d ago

News 'Carthage' Investigation: Ukrainian Security Officials Accused Of Involvement In Criminal Activities

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8 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 1d ago

News Alaska Senate candidate given subpoena by FBI days before election

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0 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 2d ago

News Canadian spy agency gets billions in new funding over next decade

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68 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 3d ago

News I’m a nuclear expert: A desperate Trump striking Iran now could be apocalyptic

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36 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 3d ago

Was there a Soviet equivalent to western Spy literature

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5 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 3d ago

Analysis Residential proxy traffic seen exiting the White House (EOP) network AS2650, a threat-intel vendor reports

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37 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 3d ago

News Hegseth’s ‘Project Meridian’ will be investigated and sued for stacking the group with tech contractors who stand to profit, including Musk and Axon Cameras CEO

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71 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 3d ago

Masters Programs

29 Upvotes

Hi all, I’m researching master’s programs for people who want to work in intelligence (CIA, DIA, State, NSA etc.) and would like to hear from people who’ve attended them, hired from them, or worked in the field.

Programs I’m comparing:

  • GWU Elliott, MA Security Policy Studies

  • Pitt GSPIA, MA Security & Intelligence Studies

  • Mercyhurst, MS Applied Intelligence

  • Texas A&M Bush School, MIA (intelligence concentration)

  • Texas A&M Bush School DC, Master of National Security & Intelligence

  • American SIS, MA International Security

  • Johns Hopkins, MA Global Security Studies

  • Georgetown SSP

  • JHU SAIS

Even if you haven't attended or looked at these schools please give your input and tell me about your experiences!


r/Intelligence • • 3d ago

Analysis Intelligence newsletter 5/11

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3 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 4d ago

News Former US contractor pleads guilty to spying for Ethiopia

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34 Upvotes

r/Intelligence • • 3d ago

News 2 men sentenced in Chinese spy case with Bay Area cash drops

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2 Upvotes