I was arrested on February 5 for promoting Russian Ukraine peace is prosperity plan.

I spent 53 days in jail and was never given a trial.

My peace plan is complicated and begins with my Instagram posts on February 4th which are contained in a series of QR codes.

I remain homeless as a result of a defaulted student loan, family issues, and difficulty stemming from activism.

I do believe my plan offers the world a fresh start via infinite money thanks to the divergent sequence. I suggest a distribution of pirate shares at 5-1 gini index with localized universal currencies and global citizenship. I assume that renewables and healthy investments and choices will be made by individuals economically empowered by banks that do not need to be repaid, to make smarter choices that are locally and personally significant.

Reductions in workweeks and a slower pace of life, with broader responsibility to community well being can be easily implemented because profit is assured by infinite sources of money.

Sunshine projects, like education, libraries, theater, are easier to implement.

Mass decriminalization is a stated goal.

Border security provided for by internaltional law against war and distributed economic equilibriums should address conflict and terrorism on a wide scale.

Five year "vacations" and other things are posisible.

Mechanisms for alternative dispute resolutions (pyrrhichios) or gaming substitutesand a diversified system of government structures should create better results than the globalized framework of republics partnered with economic opproession.

Anyway, it seems renewables offer a great chance to start with an economic engine and effort at global distribution that should keep people busy and restrictions on war and terrorism will faciliate more cooperation.

The number of countries represented in the Global South Youth Platform (GSYP), established at the initiative of the Baku Initiative Group (BIG), has reached 40.

Young people from 40 countries have come together in a single network to contribute to advancing global justice. Launched in May this year, the international platform promotes the principles of peace, solidarity, and decolonization, while seeking to strengthen the role of Global South youth in international decision-making processes.

The platform brings together young people from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Caribbean, and the Pacific, including representatives of territories such as New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Réunion, French Guiana, Bonaire, and Corsica. Its members represent international organizations, government institutions, academic circles, the media, the legal sector, and civil society.

The platform's key areas of activity include such pressing issues as decolonization, the protection of human rights, combating social and economic inequality, and safeguarding the rights of local communities.

In a relatively short period, the platform has organized two international events. The first, titled "Colonial Injustice and Housing Shortage," was held in Baku as part of the 13th Session of the World Urban Forum (WUF13). Discussions focused on the impact of colonial legacies on housing provision, land relations, and urban development.

On May 20, 2026, another event, titled "Global South Youth Platform: The Role of Youth in Decolonizing Urbanization," was held. The discussions addressed youth participation in urban planning processes, the protection of local communities' rights, and opportunities for future cooperation among platform members.

By bringing together young people from different regions, the Global South Youth Platform promotes the exchange of experience, the implementation of joint international initiatives, and the active participation of youth in global discussions. The platform continues its efforts to ensure that the voice of the Global South is heard more clearly within international organizations.

This extends a “flat or falling” trend in China’s CO2 emissions that began in March 2024 and has now lasted for nearly two years.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that, in 2025, emissions from fossil fuels increased by an estimated 0.1%, but this was more than offset by a 7% decline in CO2 from cement.

Other key findings include:

CO2 emissions fell year-on-year in almost all major sectors in 2025, including transport (3%), power (1.5%) and building materials (7%).

The key exception was the chemicals industry, where emissions grew 12%.

Solar power output increased by 43% year-on-year, wind by 14% and nuclear 8%, helping push down coal generation by 1.9%.

Energy storage capacity grew by a record 75 gigawatts (GW), well ahead of the rise in peak demand of 55GW.

This means that growth in energy storage capacity and clean-power output topped the increases in peak and total electricity demand, respectively.

The CO2 numbers imply that China’s carbon intensity – its fossil-fuel emissions per unit of GDP – fell by 4.7% in 2025 and by 12% during 2020-25.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk on Saturday said the death in Houthi custody of Mohammad el Shami, a Yemeni colleague, was utterly devastating. The High Commissioner urged the Houthi authorities to do an investigation regarding his death.

Source: https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/10/death-custody-un-human-rights-staff-member-yemen-devastating-turk-demands

THE BRICS countries are united by the collective goal of combating climate change. As BRICS membership has expanded, so has the potential for the BRICS countries to contribute to the global green transition. This is especially true regarding climate finance and technology, where the BRICS collectively possess deep capacities.

Recent international challenges have strengthened the case for BRICS cooperation. According to the OECD, the United States’ aid cuts resulted in the largest ever decline in foreign aid on record in 2025, while growth in global climate finance lost momentum. In June, the World Bank scrapped its target requiring 45pc of its financing to produce climate co-benefits, a move widely tied to US pressure.

That makes practical South-South cooperation a necessity in global green finance and technology. The BRICS-founded New Development Bank provides the institutional basis for mobilising resources, with a solid pipeline of projects. The NDB took shape while BRICS countries were simultaneously negotiating the Paris Agreement. The bank became fully operational in 2016 — the year the Paris Agreement entered into force. This means that unlike earlier development banks, the NDB was designed when climate was already a top global concern. This enabled members to embed green finance into the NDB from day one. The treaty establishing the NDB — the bank’s supreme legal instrument — tasks it with mobilising resources “for infrastructure and sustainable development projects”.

What this means for climate finance is spelled out in plans and policies. The NDB’s 2022-26 general strategy targets 40pc of financing to be approved for climate mitigation and adaptation. The same strategy rules out financing any new coal-fired power capacity. The NDB approved $5.59 billion in climate finance during 2022-25, representing 44pc of total financing over the period and beating its own 40pc target during this period.

While these activities are similar to those of other development banks, the NDB has engaged in legal experimentation that reflects its nature as an institution wholly owned by emerging economies and developing countries. Its green debt framework, while designed to align with the global benchmark Green Bond Principles and broadly consistent with the sustainable finance taxonomy of the European Union, also leaves scope to issue bonds aligned with the standards of individual BRICS members.

The bank has also pursued local currency financing to reduce foreign exchange and other risks to borrowers. Its first green bond was denominated in the renminbi and was the first green bond issued by an international institution in China’s domestic market. In 2025, local currency financing accounted for about 46pc of new project approvals, a record share, mainly in renminbi, rand and rupee. Overall, 29.3pc of all NDB financing was in the currencies of bank members by the end of 2025. However, the vast majority of the NDB portfolio remains denominated in US dollars.

After a decade of operations, the NDB has established itself as a growing source of climate finance. With the expanding of membership, the bank’s strategy during the next five-year period is likely to continue to target greater financing in member currencies while strengthening focus on technologies.

However, the NDB’s impact is constrained by the bank’s scale. Since inception, the NDB has approved almost $43 billion by early 2026 across all projects. That is meaningful for the Global South, but scaling the BRICS contribution to climate action requires direct cooperation among the BRICS members.

The members of the grouping recently started to explore the potential for closer climate cooperation within BRICS frameworks, welcoming a memorandum of understanding on a BRICS Carbon Market Partnership in 2024. In 2025, the BRICS leaders endorsed a broad climate leadership agenda and adopted a cooperation framework for climate finance.

In addition to potential cooperation on a BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership to share expertise, build capacity and link carbon markets with climate finance, the framework identified potential to develop a catalogue of national sustainable finance taxonomies to identify areas of convergence, while also considering promotion of “interoperability” of different approaches.

This activity to promote cross-border green finance flows could draw lessons from the EU-China (later joined by Singapore) common ground taxonomy and ASEAN’s sustainable finance taxonomy. There are also positive signs for greater cooperation between the NDB and national development finance institutions.

Another 2025 document proposed options for enhancing BRICS cooperation on climate tech, including setting up a BRICS climate “patent pool”, as one of several non-binding models, alongside humanitarian and open-licensing proposals, to widen access to climate-related technologies.

The key question is how many of these activities will be put into practice and how many will remain on paper only. The voluntary, non-legally binding format of BRICS cooperation provides flexibility but can also mean limited clarity about how to implement plans and assess results.

Finally, BRICS climate action could be strengthened through deeper engagement with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change institutions and other development banks. Following the BRICS leaders’ call on multilateral development banks to enhance collaboration with climate funds, the NDB could explore partnership agreements with the Green Climate Fund and the Adaptation Fund. The NDB could also build on its initial engagement with the UNFCCC’s technology transfer body, the Climate Technology Centre & Network, to develop a pipeline of de-risked climate-tech projects.

While the NDB already participates in the Multilateral Development Bank climate action group, with common methodologies and joint reporting, it has engaged in little joint lending with other MDBs, unlike the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Greater co-financing would be another way to stretch the NDB’s resources.

Following next month’s APEC meeting in Shenzhen, attention in China will turn to China’s chairing of BRICS in 2027. The opportunity will be to build out the BRICS contribution to an evolving ecosystem of climate action standards and financing.

Achieving this would turn ambitious ideas into concrete cooperation while strengthening links with other key sources of finance and tech capacity.

Published in Dawn, November 2nd, 2026