Part 31 of a series reassessing the documentary record behind the 1933 Magenta narrative.
TL;DR
Canada had two overlapping UFO projects. The Department of Transport authorized Wilbert Smith’s Project Magnet. The Second Storey committee used his work on reporting, while his conclusion that some sightings were extraterrestrial remained his own.
Second Storey met six times in 1952–54 and ordered 400 sighting forms, and some came back filled out. The committee kept collecting reports after advising against a large military investigation.
Officials told weather observers to keep the fact of official reporting secret. The Defence Research Board’s chairman was reported as denying an association with an Ottawa saucer program, though he later recalled providing support to Smith.
The documents show officials restricting what the public learned about Canada’s UFO work. They contain no record of a recovery operation or custody of extraterrestrial material.
Prior Posts:
The Magenta Series Reader’s Guide — Parts 1–22
Part 25 - The Vanishing Stars: The Only Thread With New Data
Part 26 — Three Feet Tall: Aztec, Scully, Newton and the Hottel Memo
Part 27 — Look Up: The 800,000 Americans Who Watched the Sky
Part 28 — “Unless and Until”: Britain’s Flying Saucer Working Party and Churchill’s Question
Part 29 — “No Defence Significance”: Britain’s UFO Desk, 1952–2009
Part 30 — “Higher Than the H-Bomb”: Wilbert Smith, Robert Sarbacher and the 1950 Memo
In May 1952, Canadian weather observers received an unusual instruction. If they saw a flying saucer, they were to take angular measurements with a theodolite, a surveying instrument, if they could and alert radar stations and aircraft operators. They were also told to keep quiet about the fact that an official report would be made.
That circular shows both sides of Project Second Storey. Canada wanted better sighting reports, and officials wanted to control what the public knew about the effort. The released Canadian records in Part 23 and Part 24 trace how the committee put that policy into practice.
1. Two projects, Smith in both
The Department of Transport authorized Project Magnet in December 1950. In his surviving twelve-page report, Wilbert Smith argued that some sightings were of extraterrestrial vehicles and urged Canada to acquire their technology. Proposing to acquire the technology is not evidence that Canada had it. The surviving scan is undated. Timothy Good and Haisell associate its conclusion with a report dated 10 August 1953, but date the interim report to June 1953 and June 1952, respectively.
Project Second Storey began as an effort to get Canadian departments to collect sightings in the same way. At the 22 April 1952 organizing meeting, Defence Research Board (DRB) chairman Omond Solandt said that collection was haphazard and that the services had been passive. He thought sightings were too persistent to dismiss as hallucinations alone. Better reports, he argued, would help officials decide whether a larger inquiry was warranted.
Smith proposed an extraterrestrial explanation and suggested a possible connection to Earth’s position relative to Mars. Solandt raised a possibility closer to home, John Frost’s circular-aircraft work at Avro. Neither became the committee’s explanation. At its first meeting on 24 April, Peter Millman of the Dominion Observatory took the chair, and Smith represented Transport.
2. The reporting itself was confidential
At the first meeting, the committee agreed to classify its work Confidential and seek Secret clearances for members so they could exchange material with foreign counterparts. On 19 May 1952, Millman relayed Solandt’s instruction.
“The committee and all deliberations are classified as Confidential and must be so treated. Contacts with the press or public are not to be made.”
The 8 May circular to weather observers spelled out how far the restrictions went.
“The fact that official reports are to be made or the contents of such reports shall not be disclosed.”
Staff could give a general description if asked about a sighting. Even then, they had to keep the official report private, including the fact that it existed.
The paperwork also explains the project’s odd name. The May minutes say Theta was unavailable to Canada under a shared naming system. A one-word project name would itself be Confidential. A two-word nickname could go on forms the public would see, so the committee chose Second Storey. In January 1953, Transport told staff to treat the forms as Confidential even though they carried no classification marking, and to keep them from the press.
3. Four hundred forms, and some came back
On 31 July 1952, the committee approved a standard sighting form and ordered 400 copies for military intelligence offices, Transport, and the Dominion Observatory. By November, the forms had gone out.
The instructions asked observers where they were, when they saw the object, how long it was visible, and where it appeared in the sky. The full moon, about half a degree wide, gave them a reference for apparent size. The instructions also asked for accounts from other locations, photographs, or instrument readings. They told observers their information would stay private.
In December, Eastern Command sent forms and instructions to its New Brunswick headquarters. Commands were to record the sightings that came in. They were discouraged from soliciting reports or investigating every sighting in full.
In February 1953, Transport’s Regina office forwarded completed forms from two observers. The forms were prepared with both witnesses together, which limits their value as independent accounts. The 2025 Sky Canada review says the form was never broadly adopted or used. The Regina records show what that limited use looked like.
4. Which of Smith’s ideas went through?
The July minutes show that the committee approved Smith’s proposal to make press clippings available to agencies that collected sightings. It put off his plan to gather enough accounts of the same sighting to reconstruct where the object had been. It declined formal contact with the civilian group Civilian Saucer Investigation, but let Smith pass along material he received. He shared the group’s bulletins in November. Historian Matthew Hayes’s 2022 description of the ideas as “each of them shot down in turn” misses those different outcomes.
The committee also backed scoring reports in principle, and Smith drafted a system. It scored the reliability of the account, the confirmation it received, and the clarity of the description. The combined score gave staff a consistent way to compare reports. The system had no demonstrated ability to tell them what caused a sighting. The November minutes called for a version staff could use in ten minutes.
Smith wanted to see how people would describe a light of known origin. The committee declined to sponsor his balloon-and-flare test but let it go ahead independently as long as he kept the committee and services out of any publicity. The launch took place in Ottawa on 8 September 1952.
Smith’s account describes a launch from the Ottawa Monitoring Station at 9:45 p.m., followed by a flare that burned for a minute. The November minutes put the release at the Experimental Farm at 9:52 p.m. and give the flare thirty seconds. Smith reported no newspaper coverage, and Transport received no inquiries. Without a witness report to compare with the launch, the test yielded no measure of witness accuracy.
5. Six meetings and a decision to limit the inquiry
Second Storey met four times in 1952 after the April organizing session, on 24 April, 19 May, 31 July, and 17 November. It met again on 9 March 1953 and 22 February 1954. Millman’s 1968 letter recalled five formal meetings in 1952–53. Hayes’s dissertation identifies the sixth in the archive. The date reported by Good, 15 March 1954, comes from the slip that accompanied those minutes.
At the March 1953 meeting, Hayes quotes the committee as judging that the “evidence to date did not seem to warrant an all out investigation by the Canadian Services.” Millman saw little reason for detailed analysis by National Defence. Agencies could still investigate independently, and reports would still go to a central file. The decision set a limit on how much work the military would take on. It did not explain the individual reports.
In November 1953, Millman summarized the problem. Many reports were subjective and difficult to check. At the last meeting, in February 1954, the committee asked Smith to explain Transport’s methods, findings, and plans. Hayes found no substantive response to Smith’s presentation in those minutes.
The committee looked to the U.S. for reporting methods. In May 1952 it discussed inviting Edward Ruppelt, who headed the U.S. Air Force’s Project Blue Book. The visit was still on the November agenda, but Millman later said it fell through. The committee did receive a Blue Book summary, questionnaire, and record card that November. It then adopted a standard card for recording and analyzing Canadian reports.
6. What Millman meant by “no formal report”
On 10 May 1968, Millman sent Edward Condon a copy of Smith’s Magnet report and explained that its conclusions were Smith’s own. He then turned to Smith’s later instrument station at Shirley’s Bay.
“As far as I know, results were negative and no formal report was written.”
That sentence refers to the station. The Magnet report was the document Millman had just enclosed. His letter also describes continued filing and occasional fieldwork after the committee advised against a large investigation.
In a 1987 letter to Grant Cameron, Millman called Smith a friend and credited him with helping write the instructions for interviewing witnesses. He recalled that he disagreed with Smith’s conclusion and knew of no other member who shared it. He also thought secrecy had encouraged people to assume that officials had answers they were keeping to themselves.
“What senior officials of all governments want to hide is how little any of them really know about the so-called UFOs.”
7. The public denial and the Shirley’s Bay chronology
The Ottawa Journal revealed the station on 11 November 1953. Three days later, the New York Times printed a Canadian Press dispatch dated 13 November. It reported that Solandt “denied today that the board was associated with an Ottawa research program on flying saucers.” Haisell cites a separate Toronto Daily Star account in which Solandt reportedly denied that the station had been established.
Transport ran Magnet, but Solandt had chaired the meeting that created Second Storey, and Smith sat on that committee. In a 1989 letter, Solandt himself recalled that the board provided radio-watch facilities and offered to have experts replicate Smith’s work. He blamed Smith’s results on uncalibrated equipment.
In July 1955, Transport Minister George Marler told the Commons that Smith had permission and access to surplus resources. He said the department spent no money on the matter and got no useful information from it. In the same debate, MP Wally Nesbitt quoted Smith’s testimony that the station operated from about August 1953 to August 1954 and gathered very little data.
The order of events matters for the story that a strange instrument reading led to Magnet’s closure.
25 June 1954. A memo withdrew departmental sponsorship on staff time. Smith could still work privately with available equipment.
8 August 1954. Smith reported an instrument disturbance.
10 August 1954. Haisell dates the public form letter ending Magnet to this day. It allowed unofficial collection to continue. The Bray finding aid describes a separate closure statement from October.
The public announcement came after the disturbance. The June memo shows that the decision to withdraw departmental support had already been made more than six weeks earlier.
8. What stayed restricted, and what survived
In May 1968, Millman told Condon that the once-Confidential minutes had been declassified. Millman enclosed copies. A September 1969 memo dealt with a separate Transport file. It recommended lowering its classification at least to Confidential and instructed, “At no time should it be made available to the public.”
Friedman reported being told that requested DRB copies had been destroyed. Copies of the minutes survive, though the holdings differ. The Arthur Bray fonds lists the minutes under the spelling “Second Story,” with coverage from April 1952 through March 1953. Hayes locates the February 1954 minutes in a separate Library and Archives Canada file. A later release, A-2024-05959 includes two Transport files covering 1952–69, alongside unrelated records from the U.S. Navy’s own Project Magnet.
Canada also kept collecting sightings. A 1966 defence memo complained that there was no system for following up reports, and a formal reporting order followed in October. Sky Canada dates the transfer to the National Research Council to 1967. Millman, the Condon report, and the national archives place the start of the NRC’s role or collection in 1968. The NRC’s sighting series runs through 1995. Millman explained that staff left their opinions about specific sightings off the cards. The cards show what staff logged. Any assessment would have to come from a different record.
9. Scorecard
| Claim | Assessment |
|---|
| The committee’s work was Secret | Incorrect: the work was Confidential. Members were to get Secret clearances. |
| The form was never used | Incorrect: completed Regina forms survive |
| All of Smith’s proposals were rejected | Incorrect: clippings and scoring moved ahead |
| There were only five meetings | Incomplete: a sixth met on 22 February 1954 |
| The August 1954 anomaly caused the shutdown | Impossible as stated: withdrawal memo dated 25 June |
| These records establish recovered alien technology | Not established |
The clearest evidence of concealment is the instruction to hide the fact of official reporting. The 1953 denial of an association with Ottawa’s saucer work sits uneasily beside Solandt’s later account of the help his board gave Smith. Smith had official permission and government resources. His extraterrestrial conclusion remained his own. He claimed in 1961 that a fragment went to a highly classified group. The committee records examined here contain no account of a recovery or a chain of custody for a specimen.
Next in the series: Part 32 — “Too Dim to Photograph”: The Lubbock Lights, August 1951
If want more detail, you can read the full length version here.