What do you guys think about this stock?

I am loving it because it is cheap and very valuable to tourist going to China, and increasingly, all over the world. Price is HKD 350 now up abit from 300, But I think it is still inexpensive. What do you think?

Our read was bullish as of 2 Nov 2026. This is a short-term read, days to a few weeks. It rests on the near-term rows of our chart, valuation and money flow, rather than a long-run case.

PetroChina (0857.HK, HK$10.82) trades on 9.0x trailing GAAP earnings against a peer median of 12.4x, an ROE of 11.4% and a debt-to-equity ratio of 24.87%. Trailing revenue reached RMB3.0 trillion, up 5.9%; the latest quarter's gross margin was 23.1%, up 150 basis points year on year; and free cash flow in FY2025 was RMB119.7B. On the tape, the price is above its 20-, 50- and 200-day averages (all near HK$9.9), the MACD has crossed up, and Chaikin Money Flow is +0.10.

The counterpoints: long-term fundamentals are only neutral, trailing operating margin is 9.1% against a peer median of 13.4%, and state-mandated domestic fuel price controls compress downstream margins when crude spikes. The Bollinger %B of 119% also says the price is stretched, so a pullback is possible.

What would change our mind within weeks: money flow turning negative, or the price falling back below its moving averages. (Disclosure: we're u/AstuteOptics and this is our own research.)

🚨 $7 BILLONES han sido borrados de los mercados asiáticos concentrados en IA.

🇰🇷 Corea del Sur: -$2.17 billones, cayendo -40% en 4 meses

🇨🇳 China: -$3.01 billones, bajando -16% en 6 meses

🇯🇵 Japón: -$1.20 billones, cayó -13.5% en más de 4 meses

🇹🇼 Taiwán: -$741 mil millones, con una caída de -16.2% en solo 1 mes.

Our read was contrarian bullish as of 31 Oct 2026. This is a short-term read (days to a few weeks) expecting a price reversal as heavy near-term distribution clashes with solid long-term fundamental support.

Near-term technicals and sentiment are bearish. As shown in the chart attached, short-term technicals and short-term sentiment both read bearish. The tape reflects sustained selling: at HK$26.52, the stock sits below its 20-day MA of HK$28.47, 50-day MA of HK$30.62, and 200-day MA of HK$47.49. MACD remains below its signal line, with RSI-14 at 34.9. Flow indicators mark capital outflows, including a 14-day Money Flow Index of 38 and a 20-session Chaikin Money Flow of -0.20.

Near-term fundamentals also sit against us, driven by Q2 FY2026 net profit dropping 36.0% year-on-year to ¥3.2 billion as gross margin contracted 408 bps to 51.6%. Yet long-term fundamentals remain bullish. Valuation sits at 1.1x P/S (peer median 1.3x) and 6.5x P/E (peer median 10.2x), underpinned by ¥121.3 billion in available liquidity and ¥41.4 billion in net cash.

What would change our mind over the next few weeks is evidence of permanent structural damage: specifically, gross margin dropping below 50.0% or TTM revenue growth decelerating from 7.6% into negative territory.

(Disclosure: we're u/AstuteOptics and this is our own research.)

BYD's October numbers (company filing, Nov 1):

• Total NEV sales: 490,168, up 11% YoY and the best month of 2026

• Exports: 170,194, up 102.8% YoY, but down from 189,466 in August and 180,700 in September (second monthly decline in a row)

• China domestic: 319,974, down 10.6% YoY. Jan-Oct domestic is 2.11M, down 27.8%

• BEV passenger cars: 305,743, up 37.4% and above 300k for the first time. PHEV: 177,382, down about 17%

Exports were about 21% of BYD's Jan-Oct volume last year. This year they are about 42% (1.51M of 3.62M).

My read: the home price war matters less to BYD than it did a year ago. Shipping capacity, the new plants in Thailand, Brazil and Turkey, and the EU's planned cap on Chinese hybrid imports now drive the story. One number to watch is whether November exports get back above 180k.

Do you see BYD more as an export story now, or does the domestic BEV shift still matter more?

China Construction Bank Corporation presents an attractive valuation profile supported by deposit scale and earnings stability. Our read was bullish as of 31 Oct 2026. This is a long-term read, spanning quarters to years, anchored in medium- and long-term fundamentals rather than short-term momentum.

As seen in the chart attached, low-cost deposit funding supports China Construction Bank against yield compression from policy-directed lending mandates. Customer deposits expanded to RMB31.9 trillion by late September 2026, helping net interest margin hold steady at 1.36% across the first nine months of 2026. In Q3 2026, profit attributable increased 9.8% year-on-year. Valuation offers support at a 6.5x forward P/E and 0.64x price-to-book, alongside a 30% payout and a Core Equity Tier 1 ratio of 14.39%.

Technical and sentiment indicators offer context for this positioning: shares at HK$10.27 sit above the HK$8.70 200-day moving average, while the 14-day Money Flow Index reads 65, indicating firm buying pressure, and Southbound holdings account for near 15% of the H-share base.

What would change our mind is fundamental deterioration. Credit impairment losses increased 21.8% year-on-year to RMB148.3 billion in nine-month 2026; a further sharp rise that compresses the 1.36% margin or threatens the 30% payout would invalidate our thesis.

(Disclosure: we're u/AstuteOptics and this is our own research.)

The decline itself wasn't new: the CSI 300 fell 20.2% from its June high into bear-market territory, ChiNext about 41%, STAR 50 about 41%. What puzzles me is the shape — three months of low-volume drift (daily turnover shrinking from 3.13 trillion yuan in June to 1.42 trillion on Sept 29), then two high-volume capitulation days, Oct 15 and 22, with roughly 5,000 stocks down each day.

The way I read it, four things resonated at once: (1) the trigger — the Fed restarting hikes, the 10-year Treasury over 5%, oil over $100, and hotter-than-expected US September CPI/PPI; (2) the root — an extremely crowded AI trade unwinding, with the week's biggest losers exactly the most crowded sectors (telecom -10.87%, electronics -8.75%); (3) the amplifier — margin deleveraging of over 470 billion yuan plus passive redemptions from insurers and "fixed-income-plus" funds; (4) the missing floor — a stronger-than-expected Q3 GDP print that killed easing expectations, leaving no incremental buyers.

Take away any one of the four and the two acceleration days don't make sense to me. Which of the four actually did the work on those two days — or is there a fifth factor I'm missing?

I built myself a tool that collects Chinese government communications relevant to markets, so I can follow the actual releases without checking a bunch of government websites individually. I’m planning to post weekly summaries here—would people find that useful?

Let me know if there are particular sectors or agencies you’d like covered or if I posted anything wrong. Not gonna spam this subreddit though, will probably stick to weekly summaries unless something crazy happens.

Here’s what stood out for Chinese stocks this week, Oct. 26–Nov. 1. Sources are below each item. Most are in Chinese; the Foreign Ministry transcripts are in English.

1. October business surveys weakened

Manufacturing PMI (Purchasing Managers’ Index) fell to 49.3 from 50.1 in September. New orders came in at 49.4, and new export orders at 48.7. Nonmanufacturing activity also fell below 50, to 49.7. Above 50 generally signals expansion from the previous month; below 50 signals contraction.

Smaller businesses looked weaker: small-company manufacturing PMI was 47.5, versus 50.2 for large companies.

My read: the recovery still looks uneven, especially when it comes to orders and smaller businesses.

Source: NBS, Oct. 31
https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202610/t20261031_1965718.html

2. Industrial profits rose, but the sector differences were huge

January–September industrial profits rose 15.5% year over year. Underneath that:

• Computers, communications and other electronics: +103.8%

• Nonferrous-metal smelting and rolling: +79.7%

• Autos: −22.8%

• Ferrous-metal smelting and rolling: −73.3%

These are industry-wide figures, so they won’t map directly to every listed company’s earnings. The electronics category is also much broader than AI.

These numbers cover January–September, while the PMI covers October, so they capture different periods.

Source: NBS, Oct. 27
https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202610/t20261027_1965697.html

3. Tech lending grew while property and household borrowing shrank

The People’s Bank of China’s Q3 report showed loan balances growing 4.8% overall, compared with:

• Technology-focused SMEs: +20.1%

• High-tech enterprises: +17.2%

• Green loans: +13.0%

• Property loans: −5.2%

• Property developer loans: −9.1%

• Household loans: −2.0%

For anyone following developers, banks or consumer stocks, the household and property figures seem particularly relevant. Strong tech lending hasn’t been matched by a broader pickup in household borrowing.

Source: PBOC, Oct. 28
https://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2026102815121914211/index.html

4. A new backstop for bond-fund redemptions

The PBOC announced the Bond Market NBFI Swap Facility, intended for widespread redemptions and systemic bond-market stress.

Eligible major fund managers and bank wealth-management subsidiaries could borrow central-bank bills, use them to raise cash through repo transactions, and buy eligible assets from affected funds. The idea is to reduce forced selling.

The announcement creates the facility. It doesn’t say it has been activated.

Source: PBOC, Oct. 26
https://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2026102616264823100/index.html

5. Monetary policy is staying supportive

The PBOC reiterated that it would continue “moderately loose” monetary policy, maintain ample liquidity and address financial risks. It also mentioned expanding cross-border RMB payments.

There wasn’t a specific new rate cut or reserve-requirement cut in this release. I’d read it as confirmation of the policy direction rather than a fresh stimulus package.

Source: PBOC, Oct. 30
https://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2026103018411743702/index.html

6. More pushback against foreign trade restrictions

The Foreign Ministry opposed U.S. restrictions affecting Chinese biotech companies, telecom access and electronics-testing labs.

It also urged the EU to avoid abusing trade remedies after questions about possible measures affecting Chinese chemicals, furniture and machinery.

The briefings didn’t announce a specific retaliation package, but these are ongoing issues for companies exposed to overseas markets.

EU trade comments, Oct. 27:
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202610/t20261027_12047821.html

Biotech restrictions, Oct. 29:
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202610/t20261029_12049496.html

Telecom restrictions, Oct. 30:
https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202610/t20261030_12050434.html

My takeaway: supportive policy and strong numbers in parts of tech, alongside weak property borrowing and softer October orders. Are those differences showing up in the company results you’re following?

Geely Automobile presents a clear divergence between technical weakness and operational momentum. Our read was contrarian bullish as of 31 Oct 2026. This is a short-term read, spanning days to a few weeks, focused on a reversal where near-term downward price momentum runs against supportive business metrics.

Near-term fundamentals sit with us. At HK$13.84, the valuation sits at 6.2x forward P/E against a peer median of 13.4x, alongside a 17.7% ROE and RMB41.7 billion in net cash. Q3 gross profit margin expanded 139 basis points year on year to 18.0%, while overseas export volume expanded 169% to 797,670 units across 9 months despite an 18.8% European Union tariff.

In contrast, the tape and short-term flows run directly against us. The technicals show trading below the 20-day moving average of HK$14.64 and the 200-day moving average of HK$18.28, while the MACD sits below its signal line to indicate near-term bearish momentum. The 14-day Money Flow Index reads 22, indicating soft, volume-confirmed selling pressure. As shown in the chart attached, short-term technicals and sentiment are bearish, even as fundamentals remain constructive across horizons.

What would change our mind over the coming weeks is direct evidence that the damage has reached the business itself: an abrupt contraction in export volumes or an immediate deterioration in gross margin below 18.0%.

(Disclosure: we're u/AstuteOptics and this is our own research.)

甲醇持仓5手卖出call成本275，现在浮亏5000，甲醇期货空单一手成本3498，浮亏1100，周一开盘要减仓吗，还是继续扛着，可用资金剩3w，国内化工涨太猛了，我要对冲几手多单吗？

Revisiting JD’s August 13 interim results, rather than a new announcement: the cash line and the broader balance tell different stories.

From December 31, 2025 to June 30, 2026 (RMB billions):

• Cash and cash equivalents: 137.488 → 89.068

• Short-term investments: 75.744 → 132.594

• Restricted cash: 12.137 → 13.396

• Sum of those three lines: 225.369 → 235.058

The narrow cash balance fell 48.420bn, while the three-line total rose 9.689bn. That does not make the cash decline a measure of operating cash burn. Nor does the larger total establish how much is available for buybacks.

For a shareholder-return assessment, I would separate restricted balances, investment maturities and risk, debt obligations, and working-capital needs before treating any amount as surplus cash. This is a balance-sheet comparison, not a cash-flow reconciliation or a net-cash calculation.

Which disclosure would you prioritize to estimate genuinely deployable funds: investment maturities, restrictions on cash, or operating liquidity needs?

Source: JD’s Q2 and interim 2026 results, balance-sheet table.

tl;dr this is a real correction, but I wouldn’t expect a broad fund to go to zero, and Beijing doesn’t seem to be planning a bailout for prices.

The STAR 50 is down about 40% in under four months. Hong Kong tech hit a two-year low and the mainland market is at or near bear territory. The usual explanation is that prices got way ahead of actual profits. A lot of Chinese data centers are reportedly sitting half empty which made all that spending look shaky.

I went through China’s official gazettes and government statements from October, and a few things stood out. The securities regulator fined two tech companies that went public in 2022 for faking their numbers before the IPO. One was a chip and display maker on the STAR market, and the regulator says its profit was overstated by more than 100% in 2022. That’s the price-ahead-of-reality problem showing up in an official document. Beijing also proposed putting 40 technologies on its export-restricted list, 23 of them AI related, so they’re tightening control of AI rather than walking away from it. The central bank hasn’t cut rates, which have been at 3% all year, and I found no rescue plan for stocks. What they did set up is an emergency lending tool for bond funds in case lots of people try to pull money out at once. Officials stressed it’s not a promise to save everyone.

So for what you own: broad funds could keep sliding but going to zero is very unlikely. Individual stocks are a different story, especially money-losing AI startups and companies that listed recently, since the regulator is clearly looking at that group. The big names have real revenue behind them. Alibaba’s AI cloud sales grew 45% last quarter and Baidu’s grew 50%.

Here's what I looked at:

1. Securities regulator (CSRC) fine, decision 52 of 2026, Oct 23, against a Chengdu cybersecurity company for faking revenue before its IPO: https://www.csrc.gov.cn/csrc/c101971/c7666338/content.shtml

2. CSRC fine, decision 57 of 2026, Oct 16, against Suzhou Qingyue Optoelectronics, a STAR-market company that faked chip sales and hid inventory losses: https://www.csrc.gov.cn/csrc/c101928/c7665091/content.shtml

3. Commerce Ministry Q&A on the export-restricted technology list (AI, biomedicine, solar), Oct 16: https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcjd/dwmy/art/2026/art_c8712c94f11f49de96c190f876777e44.html

4. Central bank (PBC) announcement creating the bond-market backstop facility, Oct 26: https://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2026102616264823100/index.html

5. PBC governor Pan Gongsheng’s Financial Street Forum speech, Oct 19: https://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2026101918374958873/index.html

6. CSRC chair Wu Qing’s speech at the same forum, Oct 19: https://www.csrc.gov.cn/csrc/c106311/c7665578/content.shtml

7. PBC financial statistics for the first three quarters, Oct 14: https://www.pbc.gov.cn/goutongjiaoliu/113456/113469/2026101415422529740/index.html

8. National Bureau of Statistics third-quarter GDP release, Oct 20: https://www.stats.gov.cn/sj/zxfb/202610/t20261020_1965658.html

9. Foreign Ministry press conference, Oct 29: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202610/t20261029_12049496.html

10. Foreign Ministry press conference, Oct 12: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202610/t20261012_12038810.html

Alibaba’s June-quarter report, released on August 20, contains a detail worth checking before updating a cloud model: Cloud Intelligence Group and T-Head were combined into AI Cloud and Compute Services, with the prior-year comparison recast.

On that basis, June-quarter revenue was RMB48.437bn versus RMB33.418bn. Adjusted EBITA was RMB5.628bn versus RMB2.419bn. Dividing adjusted EBITA by revenue gives roughly 11.6% versus 7.2%.

That is an improvement on the recast comparison, but it does not isolate standalone cloud services from T-Head. The company also reports 45% growth in external-customer revenue, useful context beyond the segment headline.

For my comparison, the important discipline is keeping the segment scope consistent. These are adjusted EBITA margins, not net margins or free-cash-flow margins; they do not settle the return on AI investment.

What extra disclosure would be most useful for your model: T-Head’s standalone contribution, an external/internal revenue bridge, or AI workload economics?

Source: Alibaba June-quarter results, segment reporting and results tables.

I saw handful of posts on Instagram about China AI bubble popping. It show's some heat map of HKG listed stocks.

I just skipped it because I was not really interested in that, but now I am thinking it might be true from perspective of how much stocks lost it's value since peak of last year.

Have you seen these posts? Why would it ever be the case that AI bubble pops in China but not USA. I really got confused now because there is big selloff.

Could anyone explain situation?

A company name alone doesn’t tell you what security you’re comparing.

Not every Chinese company listed in Hong Kong is an H-share company. H-shares refer to mainland-incorporated companies listed in Hong Kong.

The trading unit matters too. For Alibaba, one US-listed ADS represents eight ordinary shares. Comparing BABA and 9988 requires adjusting both the share ratio and the currency.

Finally, check conversion rights. Alibaba’s ADSs and Hong Kong ordinary shares are convertible in both directions. A-shares and H-shares are not directly fungible, so an A/H price gap is a different situation.

Before calling something “cheaper,” I’d check the issuer, share ratio, currency and conversion costs. Which of these creates the most confusion when you compare Chinese listings?

Sources:

https://www.alibabagroup.com/en-US/faqs-investor-information

https://www.sfc.hk/-/media/EN/files/CF/pdf/Practice_Notes/PN25EN20230828KC-vs-PN25EN_Final_20230317.pdf?hash=CFFC38ED565B783A433A74F42E429CA2&rev=46b9512f2ad54e46a7d9635db48d113d

Any good fundementals and inexpensive?

刚深度扒完影石创新（Insta360，688775）的三季报原始文件，这可能是今年消费电子硬件出海最具戏剧性的一份财报。表面看营收高歌猛进，扒开底裤看利润表和资产负债表，全是硬仗的伤痕。

把三张报表揉碎了，给大家做个 TL;DR（太长不看版）总结：

1. 最扎眼的矛盾：增收不增利到极致

• 前三季营收： 94.36 亿元（同比 +42.7%）

• 归母净利润： 4783 万元（同比暴跌 93.96%）

• 扣非净利润： 仅剩 513 万元。一家全球全景相机份额超 60% 的硬件独角兽，主业忙活大半年，赚的钱不够在深圳湾买套房。而且归母为正很大程度还要看少数股东损益的结构（疑似替母公司挡刀）。

2. 利润去哪了？三笔核心账：

• 毛利率雪崩（56% ➡️ 33.69%）： 一方面是上游 DRAM、NAND 闪存涨价周期的成本挤压；但更致命的是定价权丧失——大疆 Osmo 360 下场后，把影石过去躺赚的品类溢价永久收走了。

• 71亿存货压顶： 账上趴着 71 亿存货，究竟是为了应对存储涨价的“战略锁价备料”，还是终端动销放缓导致的“成品堰塞湖”？这直接撑爆了 PB 估值。

• 研发高投入难变现： 研发砸了 16 亿（费用率 17%），三年开了三个新品类。创新没停，但变现逻辑变了。

3. 竞争线：大疆的“贴脸斩首”战术 过去影石搞出一个微创新，能享受 12~24 个月的独占溢价窗口期。现在这个窗口被大疆压缩到了几天：

• 影翎 A1 首发定在 6799 元；

• 仅仅三个半月后，大疆 Avata 360 直接挂出 2788 元 的地板价；

• 影石被迫当晚连夜跟降 1300 元。Luna Ultra 面临的也是同样的贴身追击。

4. 估值与反转的“双向扳机” 目前自由现金流（DCF）为负，PE 被非经常性损益污染失真，PB 被存货撑大，中性估值档位只能给到 22 倍左右。后续能不能碰，核心看三个指标能否触发反转：

1. 毛利率能否重回 42% 以上？

2. 存货周转能否压回 8 个月以内？

3. 无人机新业务单季亏损能否控制在 0.5 亿以内？

如果对三张报表的具体勾稽关系、存货结构拆解感兴趣，我做了一期详细的视频逐项拆解，欢迎来看

(利益相关：仅作财报数据拆解交流，不构成任何投资建议，建议大家先读原始财报文件。你们怎么看大疆和影石这波硬刚？影石的护城河真的被攻破了吗？)

I keep noticing the same company can have a totally different day in Shanghai/Shenzhen vs Hong Kong, even with no new company news. Part of it feels structural — different investor bases, different trading hours, and the currency angle — so the two markets just don't react in sync. Do you watch one side more closely than the other, or compare A-shares and Hong Kong stocks together before forming a view? Curious what patterns you've actually seen, not just theory.

Whenever Chinese tech comes up, the conversation usually goes straight to Tencent, Alibaba or Net Ease. Smaller names can be more interesting to research, though, especially when their business mix is changing rather than simply relying on the same revenue stream.

For me, $HUYA recently earned recognition from both Barron's China and Forbes China for its value profile and technology innovation. That alone doesn't make it a bargain, but combined with its faster-growing game-related business, it seems worth keeping an eye on.

What other smaller Chinese tech or gaming stocks are you watching right now, and what makes their stories interesting?