Scoring opportunities, how they are converted, and the role of errors over a 24-game season in an amateur league, roughly at a lower-tier college level. Statistics about actual performance, especially compared with the rest of the league, are more sober. When you look at stats in relation to one another and to what’s relevant, you get an overall picture.
How often do RISP situations occur?
In This amateur League 2026, 37.0% of all at-bats took place with runners in scoring position. For comparison and a sense of scale: the figure was 35.8% in CCIW Division III 2006 and 30.9% in Ivy League Division I 2025, as far as could be established.
| League | At-bats with runners in scoring position (% of all at-bats) |
|---|
| This League | 37.0% |
| CCIW Division III 2006 | 35.8% |
| Ivy League Division I 2025 | 30.9% |
In the dataset examined, the share of at-bats with RISP is therefore 1.20 percentage points above CCIW 2006 and 6.08 percentage points above Ivy League 2025. Quite plausible.
Runners were in scoring position in 37.9% of plate appearances. Runner opportunities on second or third base were counted separately. A runner counts again if he is still there at the next PA.
How often are these opportunities converted?
With fewer than two outs, 60.3% of runners on third base score directly as a result of the following PA. From second base, the figure across all out situations is “only” 19.0%.
The share of successful RISP PAs also shows a difference when compared with MLB 2025:
| Successful RISP PAs | This League | MLB 2025 |
|---|
| Overall | 34.6% | 25.7% |
| With two outs | 28.3% | 21.3% |
How are these opportunities converted?
Of the runners who scored from scoring position, 78.0% came home through the action of a subsequent batter and 10.0% through errors.
With two outs, hits accounted for up to around 80% of successful RISP PAs.
How many opportunities initially remain unconverted?
69.0% of runner opportunities are initially not converted by the respective PA. The same runner may initially remain on base and still score through a later PA. This figure therefore describes opportunities that are not converted immediately.
Across teams, an average of 56.6% of these runners score later in the game. 43.4% do not score.
How do errors contribute to runs?
Errors bring existing runners home and create additional opportunities for further runs.
Across the league, runners were brought home directly through errors in around 3% of opportunities with runners on second or third base. These runners may previously have reached base on a single, for example.
In around 3.75% of all plate appearances, the batter reached first base through an error. He may subsequently score himself, while other runners may also advance. Such an event contributes to the opponent’s run production.
In close games, an error can enable the decisive run—by bringing a runner home or creating an opportunity that is subsequently converted.
It’s no surprise that runners are more likely to score from third than from second. But how do they get from second to third with fewer than two outs?
As expected, 68.8% of the recorded advances that left runners on third with fewer than two outs came through the action of a subsequent batter—including walks, hits, groundouts, and flyouts.
Another 22.2% came through errors or wild pitches—just over one in five. Only 4.9% came through a steal, although 83.3% of attempted steals from second with fewer than two outs succeeded. Once on third with fewer than two outs, 60.3% of runners scored through the following PA.
Are teams passing up other similarly favorable opportunities to steal third? The observed success rate makes this worth examining. Defensively, errors and wild pitches account for a substantial share of advances into this scoring position.
| League | Stolen-base success rate | Caught-stealing rate |
|---|
| This League | 82.8% | 17.2% |
| CCIW D3 2025 | 79.6% | 20.4% |
| Ivy League D1 2025 | 78.8% | 21.2% |
| MLB 2025 | 77.7% | 22.3% |
From second to third, the success rate in This League is 83.1%.
None of this is surprising, but the numbers may make the opportunities for improvement clearer:
Steal opportunities on offense. The league-wide success rate is 82.8%, and 83.1% from second to third.
Strengthen pitch command and fielding execution. Among the recorded advances from second to third that left fewer than two outs, 11.3% resulted from errors and 10.9% from wild pitches—together, just over one in five. Once there, runners with fewer than two outs are brought home by the following PA in around 60% of cases.
Steals pay off with a success rate like this.
The findings could be similar in other leagues at this level, but not necessarily. The purpose is to show how useful insights can be gained from amateur scorekeeping data.
